Monday, August 25, 2003

Staying with foreign policy, the Sunday Globe printed an interesting review essay on the divisions within conservatism over "empire," "imperialism," and "hegemony." Wilsonian idealists (read the wicked neo-conservatives) at the Weekly Standard and National Review want to project American economic, political, and military power across the world, while Hobbesian realists at the National Interest want a multi-polar, cautious, almost coy policy that projects power only in a strictly defined "American national interest."

But of course, the problem is in the multiple definitions of "national interest." Both sides insist (rather obviously) that they are working in the nation's best interests, the extroverts through projection, the introverts through cautious, limited expectations and goals. The former say "use American power to quash threats and spread American ideals to prevent future threats," while the latter reply "use American power sparingly and wisely, else overuse will cause the threats you seek to prevent by creating a bitter, desperate backlash -- ie. terrorists and dictators will develop WMDs to check expanding American power." Not a debate that will go away anytime soon.

On a related point, the Standard is now claiming that three things are needed to seal victory in Iraq: more troops, more money, and more civilian personnel. Thus far, I have been with the neocons in the Iraqi endeavor. Simply put, I do not think (and I have not heard) any reasonable alternatives to the present Iraq policy, that will not weaken American power and influence abroad. Which is more likely to decrease the probability of Arab terror, anti-Western attitudes, and inhumanity? More rounds of diplomacy, foreign and military aid bribes, and simplistic pro-Israelism? How have these things made a September 11th less likely in the past 40 years? Or a shocking, aggressive, massive response of American power into the Arab world, not only to change Iraq but to show the region what they can expect if they act in improper ways? No one is afraid of paper tigers, and until 2001 that is what America was for much of the Middle East.

The problem is not over-projection, but under-projection. After Baghdad fell, American energy in rebuilding Iraq seems to have fallen by the wayside, as we congratulated ourselves on how fast the Iraqis folded. Great, the American Army is the best in the world, now what? Are we tracking and squashing the anti-American threats to the best of our ability? Are we controlling the borders to prevent radical Syrians and Iranians from infiltrating the country? Are we doing those basic things for Iraqis that city-dwellers around the world expect from their mayors and city councils (pick up the trash, keep the lights on, and keep me from getting robbed or murdered -- I know this because I lived in DC for 7 years these 3 things rarely occured simultaneously)? The answer seems to be, no. Michael Ledeen in NRO says this:

It is hard to believe that the president approves of this state of affairs, especially as he sees the poll results that document the American people's mounting dissatisfaction with developments in Iraq. They are right to be upset, and they are likely to get angrier still if, as I expect, the terror war against us gets uglier. I am an admirer of George W. Bush. He seems to have extraordinarily good instincts and the kind of faith-based courage that makes for good leadership under terrible circumstances. But I do not think he has come to grips with the systematic myopia of our policymakers, and the culture of self-deception that afflicts our intelligence community.

You don't need master spies to see what's going on in the Middle East, or brilliant diplomats to tell you that we are playing for enormous stakes. Most normal Americans, unencumbered by visions of diplomatic breakthroughs and negotiated settlements, sense that we are losing the initiative, and that this is costing us money, blood and prestige. We are indeed at war, but we have inexplicably stopped waging it.

Faster, please.


Has American foreign policy the attention span of those who watch too much tv? Press on.

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