Needless to say, as any consistent reader knows, Niall Ferguson is our favorite historian. Deliciously contrarian and thoughtful. He concisely reviews his ideas on the American Empire with the Atlantic here, and below are a few choice nuggets:

To [19th century British liberals], globalizing the British model was synonymous with globalizing liberalism. They looked around and said, Well, not many people have our combination of institutions. What we need to do is plant the seed of this system in as many places as we can and make the world suitably Anglicized. It's only a contradiction in terms if you define "liberal" in a rather early-twenty-first-century American way, meaning that you like to hug trees, or you have a fit if somebody fires a gun in anger. My sense of liberal is the classical sense. Liberalism stands for creating the institutions of political, economic, and social freedom. And it's very obvious that in a dozen or more countries in the world, there is absolutely no chance of those institutions developing autonomously. These countries are either so under tyranny, or so completely anarchic, that it's never going to happen.

A lovely little liberal distinction, no?

First, remember that people may kill one another even more in the absence of empire—see sub-Saharan Africa. Second, if we don't extend our civilization, an even worse empire may emerge—see the Cold War. It is the habitual fantasy of many Americans that if the U.S. would just stop intervening abroad everybody in the world would enact the lyrics of John Lennon's "Imagine." History suggests otherwise.

Spontaneous peace as contrary to the record of history -- what a shocking revelation, Dr. Ferguson. And how awful is it to think that too many Americans (and American leaders) believe in a foreign policy remarkably similar to a Lennon song? "You may say I'm a dreamer, but I'm not the only one." Lords knows that's true, and that's what worries me. Turn off the radio and go the library.

American overstretch, to use Paul Kennedy's term, is not about external imperial adventures. It's about domestic programs, Medicare in particular. The operation itself—conquest of Iraq—is cheap. The defense budget is still going to come in comfortably under its Cold War average this year. I think a lot of Americans don't quite see that—they assume this is costing a huge amount of money. In truth, the real financial problems lie at home ... The reality of the Bush Administration's fiscal policy is that it has actually significantly increased expenditure on a number of things that could be thought of as social policy. If you look at the items of federal expenditure that have gone up since 2000, obviously the military and terrorism-related expenditures are number one. But actually expenditure on what might be thought of as domestic programs has gone up too. And that's not starving the beast. It seems to me that there are elements of this administration that are more like the old Nixonian republicanism, which said you spend what you have to spend to make sure you win the election. That, I think, is much more what's driving policy.

Confirms what I have said now for a couple of years, that we are witnessing another Nixon Administration, particularly in domestic policy. Talking like Reagan and Goldwater, acting like Nixon and Rockefeller.

In a way, if you are the imperial power you have to accept that people are going to hate you however you go about spreading your influence. One of the problems Americans have is this desire to be loved. Legitimacy isn't necessarily based on affection. It's based on credibility. And I think what we're seeing in Iraq is just the latest in a series of tests of American resolve and credibility. It's not the hatred one should worry about, it's the contempt. The legitimacy that the United States will achieve if it makes a success of Iraq will outweigh the inevitable resentment. You need to be respected. And the United States has a long way to go before it attains that respect, most obviously in the Middle East.

Exactly. How often do I hear the annoying line, "we are losing the hearts and minds." So what? What is it with this continuous need to be loved? Who we are, how we live, and how we use our power will always create envy, jealousy, and hatred. Those are givens. But if we see them as obstacles, we will never achieve the respect (read: fear) upon which success is built. If Iraq ever builds a successful liberal state, it will not be because they love Americans, it will be because they (1.) want it, and (2.) fear American power if they refuse to defend it. Hearts and minds that love America seem entirely beside the point.